The coronavirus crisis

This blog has been sadly neglected in recent years, as all my blogging time and energy have been taken up with my Brexit Blog. But the current coronavirus crisis prompts me to return to it, because so much of what is happening in this crisis has an organizational dimension, and some of it relates directly to the themes of the book which this blog accompanies. In this post, I’ll discuss some of them, with the focus on what is happening in the UK but no doubt at least some of it has a wider relevance.

Overall, it’s possible to see many of the chickens of contemporary organization coming home to roost. This is most obvious in the National Health Service where spending as a percentage of GDP effectively flatlined between 2011 and 2019, and per capita is well below that of most other highly developed countries (e.g. France, Germany, Japan, Australia). Crucially, this is against the background of a rapidly ageing population and – as has also been laid bare by the coronavirus pandemic – a social care system that was already in crisis and has been for at least half a decade (as discussed on this blog in May 2016).

The issues here go well beyond those of funding, though. They also relate to managerial apprehensions of the ‘efficient’ use of that funding. In the book (p. 142) I use the specific example of the NHS to discuss this, writing that “one way this has been done is to reduce spare capacity in the system. This in turn has the effect that unusual peaks in demand, such as a major incident or a flu epidemic, swamp the system … the question still remains: efficient for whom? Is spare capacity inefficient from the point of a view of a patient caught up in a demand peak?”

This seems almost prophetic now, as the NHS faces a desperate struggle to obtain the machinery and protective equipment needed to deal with coronavirus, whilst old people dying in care homes are not even included in the official coronavirus mortality statistics. Of course, it would be absurd to argue that any health system could permanently maintain all of the spare capacity needed to deal with so unprecedented crisis. But running a system for years without any spare capacity at all was always bound to lead to disaster.

Similarly, we are now seeing the consequences of the endless restructurings and in particular the dynamic of centralization-localization as the supposedly inefficient bureaucracy of the NHS is subjected to almost yearly reforms. It was such an analysis which led to the fragmentation of the NHS into Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), to break down the ‘monolith’ of the NHS. This was happening even as it was being reported that the problem with NHS procurement was lack of centralization, but under the dogma of ‘post-bureaucracy’ this was ignored (discussed on p. 87 of the book). Fast-forward to the coronavirus crisis and what do we fine? That very quietly the government has taken back central control of procurement from the CCGs to deal with it.

Nor is it only in health care that we see the consequences of the ill-judged managerial reforms and budget cuts of the last decade or more. I wrote on this blog in October 2016 about the crisis that was already underway in prisons. No surprise, then, that coronavirus is sweeping through them now, and there are calls for the early release of at least low-risk offenders and prisoners on remand.

Beyond public service issues, the coronavirus crisis has laid bare the inequalities and insecurities associated with the new capitalism and its associated ‘precariat’ (discussed on p. 118-120 of my book). The supposedly self-employed ‘entrepreneurs’ and zero hours workers of Uberfied business models are by the far the most economically vulnerable to the lockdown of the economy. The gap between this precariat and the salariat (like me) who have continued security as they work from home is more obvious than ever. It falls to government, at least partially, to bear the costs of this – in effect bailing out the employers who have for years benefitted from this ‘flexible’ workforce. As with the financial crisis, what we see is a privatization of profits and a socialization of costs and risks.

Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands who had never expected to now turn to the welfare system and find that it is very far from the generous safety net they had imagined, let alone the scroungers’ paradise that the tabloid press had led them to believe (see also p.120 of book). This is not just a matter of a one-off crisis. Rather, it comes against the background of the middle-calls insecurity which has been underway for some time, and is intimately linked to the demise of middle management and the white-collar underclass that has characterized the new capitalist model (p.123 of book; see also this blog post from February 2015).

Intimately linked to precarious employment is the use of foodbanks (blog post from September 2016) and here, too, coronavirus has had an impact. On the one hand, they face mounting demand as people’s incomes dry up. On the other, staffing and donations are both impacted by the illness, and some foodbanks are having to close down just as they are most needed.

No doubt there are many more examples of how coronavirus is exposing underlying issues within the organization of public services, of work, and of society more generally. The key words are ‘exposing’ and ‘underlying’. In this post I have made frequent reference to what I wrote in my book or on this, accompanying, blog. The message is not meant to be a self-congratulatory ‘I told you so’. Rather, it is intended to show how so much of what is happening grows directly out of things we already knew, or which were already happening.

This is absolutely crucial for otherwise they would just be regarded as ‘crisis’ events and, as such, unusual or short-lived. This in turn would support the idea that once the crisis is over we can and should return to ‘business as usual’. To an extent, this is what happened after the financial crisis. Although many expected that it would lead to a wholesale re-evaluation of how – at the most generic level – we organize, that didn’t really happen. Instead, we saw what Colin Crouch aptly dubbed the strange non-death of neo-liberalism.

Perhaps this time things will be different. The neo-liberal or new capitalist model has been much more challenged by the coronavirus in that it has led to the mobilization of state resources in a way not seen since the Second World War. That ought, at least for a while, to put paid to the innumerable paeans to the superiority of the market for any and every political and economic question. It feels, at least at the moment, as if something quite fundamental has ruptured – although one should be wary in assuming that any such rupture will have predictable, let alone positive, effects. And even should they be positive, it is a tragedy that it will have taken the deaths of so many to demonstrate what was, in so many ways, already obvious.

Wells Fargo farrago

The unfolding scandal at US bank Wells Fargo, one of the most historic organizations in the USA, is an interesting illustration of the perils of managerial target-setting (see p. 30 of book). What seems to have happened is that sales staff were under such pressure to meet sales targets that they simply invented new bank and credit card accounts – and not just here and there: as many as two million bogus accounts were created.

But this story is also interesting in showing that such perverse incentives are not just an arcane matter of organizational theory. The scandal led to the company having to pay out on a $185 million lawsuit, and the resignation this week of its Chairman and CEO, John Stumpf. And it shows the weakness of corporate whistle blower legislation.

Target setting lies at the heart of many organizational failures and scandals in recent years, whether that be the British NHS or mortgage lenders’ payment protection policies. There is little sign that the lessons of these have been learned. A huge scandal in waiting is the UK deregulation of pensions, which allows people to draw down and spend or invest their pension pot on the advice of salespeople working, of course, to sales targets. Watch this space for what will undoubtedly result in the coming years: pensioners in poverty because they have blown their savings under the paradoxical dogma of 'choice'.

Targets encapsulate the core issue of formal and substantive rationality in organizations (pp. 21-25) because they prioritise the former over the latter. Formal rationality valorises target setting as a means of control; substantive rationality valorises ethical conduct. The irony is that the former is seen as hard-headed business logic whilst the latter is seen as fluffy ethical stuff but, as Wells Fargo shows, that is a false logic. Had Wells Fargo been more substantively rational, it would not face its current problems.

Pulling teeth

Many thanks to those readers of this blog who have written to me commiserating with the dental problems I talked about in my last post. Treatment is still ongoing.

But it seems that I am lucky in having a dentist who offered me the choice of root canal treatment rather than an extraction. Because it is reported today that many dentists now extract teeth unnecessarily as they receive the same amount from the NHS as for more lengthy and expensive treatments such as root canal surgery. NHS dentists are paid per ‘unit of dental activity’ and both extraction and root canal surgery constitute three units of dental activity. But since an extraction takes on average half the time of root canal surgery, there is an incentive to extract.

Here we have a very precise illustration of the perverse effects of targets, discussed on p.33-34 of the book, and the nature of bureaucratic dysfunctionalism. Like so much else that I write about in the book, the issue is not just one of the technicalities of organizational systems. Rather, dentistry in the UK has fallen apart for ideological reasons. Unlike other NHS services, it is no longer free at the point of use and quite hefty charges have to be paid. Indeed in many parts of the UK it is impossible to get access to an NHS dentist at all.

The roots (hah!) of this go back to the 2006 dental contract, the high watermark of New Labour infatuation with quasi-market and managerial solutions to the provision of public goods. In the intervening period there have been numerous complaints and reports, but nothing much has changed so that in March 2016 the British Dental Association (BDA) said:

​“The 2006 dental contract is not fit for purpose. It rewards dentists for hitting government targets for treatment and repair, not for improving their patients’ oral health. It was meant to improve access to NHS dentistry and put prevention at the heart of the service, but it has failed on its own terms. It has deskilled and demoralized the profession, and received criticism from patient groups, government, the Health Select Committee and the Chief Dental Officers for England and Wales.”

It’s important to understand that behind the bloodless formulation of being ‘not fit for purpose’ lie real people and real suffering. The consequence is self-dentistry, meaning, to be blunt, people extracting their own teeth with pliers. This in one of the richest countries in the world.

Ageing badly

There is plenty of public discussion of the complex issues involved in being a parent, but far less about having parents. What I mean is the issues arising for people in middle-age having to care for and cope with their ageing parents. Those issues are made more complex by the way that families tend now to be dispersed geographically and the much longer live spans that are now common. The consequence is the necessity of engaging with the organization of care for the elderly. In the UK, at least, that organization is woefully inadequate and in crisis.

Longer live expectancy is both a consequence of medical care and a cause of the need for medical care. This in turn requires increased health expenditure, but in 2015 the UK health expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 8.5%: lower than Greece, lower than most west European countries, and far lower than the US. Against this, it has to be recognized that the UK system is far more efficient than others in translating expenditure into health outcomes. Maybe more important, though, is that increases in UK health expenditure don’t match increased costs (healthcare cost inflation is much higher than general price inflation) and increased demand (driven primarily by ageing).

But healthcare is only one part, and not necessarily the most important part, of the organization of ageing. Most health expenditure arises in the last two years of life; whether that life ends at 70 or 90. No, the real issue is the organization of care, and this is in complete crisis. Whereas it used to be provided mainly by local authorities, now there is a hybrid system of private care homes part-funded by local authorities. Budget cutbacks mean that the part-funding is increasingly inadequate; whilst the crazy financial engineering of some private home owners like the collapsed Southern Cross (discussed on p.115 of the book) exacerbates the problem.

The two aspects of health care and care homes are closely related. Both emergency and routine care departments of hospitals can’t discharge elderly patients because there is nowhere for them to go, especially if they are ‘unprofitable’ from a care home perspective. On the other hand, as a report this week highlights, in other cases the elderly are being discharged back to their own homes when they are incapable of coping, with horrific consequences.

All of this is absolutely to do with failures in the way that we organize. The privatized, often private equity firm-owned care home system is simply absurd, and passes on its inefficiencies to the public sector NHS. But beyond that is the obvious absurdity of dividing health and social care at all. There has been much talk of overcoming it, and some areas in England have made progress in doing so but overall the separation remains stubbornly in place.

As is often – perhaps always – the case, the issues relate to both organizations in the institutional sense (the structures of, in this case, health and social care) and to ideational organization (the construction of ‘health’ and ‘care’ as categories). Underlying the latter is perhaps also the more profound division of the public and private realms, so that health care is something that happens in the public domain of the hospital ward and social care something that happens in the private domain of the home (even if the home is an institutional ‘care home’). This in turn means that much suffering remains hidden (‘at home’) and experienced by both the elderly and their families as a ‘private’ problem, and possibly a stigma.

The psychology of this is undoubtedly very complex, since the relations between (adult, ageing) children and (aged) parents has the capacity to engender guilt, frustration, anger, fear and much else besides. Psychology has been much concerned with the relationships of children and parents in infancy, but perhaps much less so (at least, that’s my impression) with those in adulthood. The dynamics of the latter are surely taking new forms as extended old age and associated dependency become the norm rather than the exception.

In 1911 in the UK life expectancy was 51 years; by 2013 it was 81 years. In 1911 there were 107 people in Britain aged 100 or over; in 2013 there were 13,780. A similar pattern can be found across the developed world. Organizationally, and emotionally, we have not really caught up with these profound demographic changes.

Legitimate questions

The concept of legitimacy is central to organizations in many ways, most obviously in terms of who has the right to tell others what to do, and what kinds of things this applies to. That is one reason why many books about organization studies – including mine – begin by talking about Max Weber’s account of authority (in the meaning of legitimate power).

I was thinking about this in relation to the current political row in the UK about the House of Lords’ rejection of a House of Commons policy to cut tax credits for people in work. I won’t discuss the tax credits issue itself - important as it is – it is the issue of legitimacy that I want to look at. Britain, famously and unusually, has an ‘unwritten constitution’, and so relies on custom and precedent to determine what is legitimate. In this way, it could be seen as a system based partly on what Weber called ‘traditional authority’ in contrast to the rational-legal authority of written constitutions.

Since the House of Commons is elected on the basis of, certainly, a system of rules and to this extent rational-legal, and the House of Lords is an unelected body the government have been keen to say that the Lords’ action was illegitimate. More precisely, the argument is that it is illegitimate because it violates the ‘convention’ that the Lords will not block financial legislation or legislation deriving from an elected government’s manifesto.

But convention is a rather slippery terrain. As regards tax credits, what was blocked by the Lords was not, technically, financial legislation but, rather, a ‘statutory instrument’. It’s an arcane point that needn’t detain us except to the extent that it shows the imprecision of ‘tradition’ as a legitimating principle. On the other side of the coin, the House of Commons, whilst certainly elected, has a government majority on the basis that the ruling Conservative Party achieved 36.9% of the votes cast on a turnout of 66.1% of the electorate. In other words, 24.4% of the electorate voted for them.

Moreover, although the Conservative Party manifesto promised extensive cuts to the welfare budget, it did not specify that these would include cuts to the tax credits of working people. It is at least questionable whether they would have been elected had they done so. My sense is that what the electorate thought was meant by welfare cuts was cuts to benefits of people out of work. One might say so much the worse for them, but even so the point is that democratic consent to this policy looks rather threadbare.

The imprecision of party manifestos is by no means new. For example, at the 2010 election the Conservative manifesto promised that there would be no top-down re-organization of the NHS. In government (with Liberal Democrat support) there was massive and controversial re-organization. The disjuncture became an argument about what ‘top-down’ meant. At one time these manifestos consisted of quite precise lists of policies. Now, they tend to be much vaguer. And this in turn links with a far more ‘presidential’ approach to UK politics in which the persona of the leader is the key issue, even though the ‘constitutional convention’ is that a House of Commons is elected constituency by constituency and the leader is the person who can command a majority. Thus a key aspect of the last election was which of David Cameron or Ed Miliband was the most ‘prime ministerial’. So, here, what is at stake is what Weber called ‘charismatic authority’.

This complex mish-mash of rational-legal, traditional and charismatic authority makes for plenty of political spectacle and debate. But I wonder if it does not also show the limitations of Weber’s ideal-types of authority? Isn’t it actually rather common for, say, a CEO to draw selectively and eclectically on the different types*? And more challengingly, isn’t the idea that there is a distinction of authority and power a rather dubious one? After all, whatever is decided about tax credits, those affected by or hostile to the changes will ultimately be forced to accept them.

On a more personal note, this week I was awarded the title Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). This, too, is about legitimate authority – the Academy’s legitimacy to award the title, the legitimacy it bestows on me. But of course I am just shoehorning this in to make it fit with the rest of the post. The truth is that I am rather pleased and want to boast about it.

 

*Something like this has always been the critique of ideal-type reasoning and the defence, of course, is that these are ideal-types, for conceptual clarification rather than empirical claims. I suppose that my point is that in political debates like this one an ideal-type is treated, at least by implication, as an empirical claim.

Intended consequences

In the book, I make much use of the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ – the way that, in particular, rational-legal rules give rise to effects that were not only different to those intended but run directly counter to what was intended. My last post on the VW emissions scandal provided a current example.

But sometimes the situation is more complex, and I return here to the case of regulations around smoking, about which I have written in another post on this blog, and, with Jo Brewis, also written an academic paper (Brewis & Grey,2008). The latest development is that today a law has come in to force banning smoking in cars when a person less than 18 years old is present in the car. It’s by no means an objectionable law, in and of itself, because who would want to claim that smoking in a car with children is in any way a good thing?

What is interesting about this law, though, is that it is manifestly doomed to failure. Police representatives have already said that it is unenforceable, partly due to lack of resources but also because of detection problems. For example, electronic cigarettes are not included in the legislation so a police patrol would not easily be able to tell whether an offence was being committed, nor is it easy to know the age of passengers from a patrol car. Moreover, the legislation allows 17 year olds to smoke in cars if the passengers are 18, allows smoking in convertibles with the hood down, and allows smoking in caravans and motorhomes, even if children are present, so long as the vehicle are not at that point moving.

We might, then, assume that the intended consequence is to stop smoking in cars with children and that the unintended consequence is it not working. But in fact the situation is more complex. The long-term aim of anti-smoking activists is the eradication of all smoking, but they approach this goal stealthily because smoking is such a strongly culturally embedded practice. From that perspective, the failure of this latest legislation will be desirable, because when it fails it will justify a new law banning all smoking in all vehicles in all circumstances.

Social science research is sometimes criticised for lacking the predictive power of natural science, so here I will make a prediction. Within, say, five years (and I would expect less rather than more) a total smoking ban in cars will be in force. And as soon as it is, or even, possibly, before there will be lobbying for a ban on smoking in houses where children are present. Once again few will object, because no one could really mount a case that it would be good to allow it. So a law will follow, which will of course be even more unenforceable than that against smoking in cars with children. From which will ‘logically’ follow that all smoking by anyone in any house will be banned.

By that point, the situation as regards public spaces (e.g. bars) and private spaces (e.g. homes) will be identical: smoking in both is banned. So what happens then? Well, look at what is happening around the regulations on public spaces. At first, it was just indoors. Now, it is increasingly in parks and on beaches which are public spaces but outdoors, including outside pub doorways. The rationale for this is not that others might inhale the fumes, but that those (especially children) seeing it might think that smoking was ‘normal’. So, once there is a ban on smoking inside homes, it will get extended to smoking outside home, for example in gardens. In other words, as each new rule ‘fails’, that failure provides the rationale for a new rule. It is in this sense that failure is an intended consequence of regulation since it paves the way for successfully extending regulation.

With smoking now very much a minority activity in the UK and many other countries, few will shed a tear about any of this (and it’s not my intention that anyone should: I just want to provide an interesting illustration of a particular phenomenon around unintended consequences). But it’s worth reflecting that with the campaign to reduce smoking now being acknowledged as the gold-standard of public health campaigns, the same tactics are being applied to another deeply culturally embedded practice (as smoking was a generation ago), namely alcohol consumption.

As with smoking, the initial restrictions have been around advertising. Then (rather like the 1970s campaign that smokers should choose cigarettes with filters and leave long stubs) there has been the definition of safe drinking limits, which turn out to have been ‘plucked out of air’. Now, as happened with smoking, some campaigners say that there is no safe limit for alcohol, and although that is not mainstream in the way that it is for smoking it is accepted to be true for pregnant women. Meanwhile, just as there used to be a differentiation of ‘light’ or ‘social’ smokers from the hardcore we have a similar differentiation of social and ‘binge’ drinkers, with a binge drinker being someone drinking more than 3 pints of beer. The key move in anti-smoking discourse was to establish the notion of passive or secondary smoking, and the same shift has been mooted by former UK Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson, who is also responsible for the Orwellian declaration of aiming for the complete denormalization of smoking.

So here’s another prediction – as smoking fades away, restrictions on alcohol will increase along with restrictions on sugar and ever more demonization of obesity. Each restriction will give rise to failures which far from being unintended will have been designed to fail, in order to justify further restrictions. But the law of unintended consequences will still hold, and indeed it is already very clear that this is so. Because the more that unhealthy practices, such as smoking, drinking and over-eating are reduced, the more we see the degradations of dementia, of old age blighted by complex and intractable multiple illnesses, of obscure cancers that were rarely known before.

Moreover, since taxes on smoking are, massively, a net contributor to the NHS (and the same is true for alcohol) the less we smoke the more difficult it will be to fund the healthcare for the longer lives we will indubitably – for, of course, the anti-smoking campaigners are quite right to point to its dangers – be living. But that, too, is not really an example of an unintended consequence since, as Jo Brewis and I argued in our article, the real motivation of the anti-smoking movement is not public health, but the imposition of a morality about smoking that long precedes, and proceeds quite independently of, any scientific or medical rationality. They simply reproduce, in modern language, King James I's (1604) Counterblaste to Tobacco:

Have you not reason then to bee ashamed, and to forbeare this filthie noveltie, so basely grounded, so foolishly received and so grossely mistaken in the right use thereof? In your abuse thereof sinning against God, harming your selves both in persons and goods, and raking also thereby the markes and notes of vanitie upon you: by the custome thereof making your selves to be wondered at by all forraine civil Nations, and by all strangers that come among you, to be scorned and contemned. A custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomelesse.

 

Right diagnosis, wrong prescription

A long-delayed report into the organization of the British National Health Service (NHS) has belatedly been published this week, with remarkably little media coverage. It was prepared by Stuart Rose, the former boss of retailer Marks & Spencer, and we might wonder to what extent his expertise is relevant to the NHS. Nevertheless, he makes a good fist of explaining how constant and contradictory changes have led to ‘change fatigue’; how targets have had a dysfunctional effect; and that the recent marketization of the NHS in particular has led to a virtually unmanageable situation.

So far, so good, and very much in line with what I have written recently on this blog about unhealthy management and healthy bureaucracy in the NHS. Unfortunately, Rose goes on to wheel out the tired and predictable nostrum that the solution is better leadership and leadership training. We’ve been round this loop endlessly in, especially, the public sector: first it’s better management that’s needed, then better structures, then culture change, then better leadership. Leadership, especially, currently takes on an almost magical character as the universal panacea for what ails organizations. There's an extraordinary impoverishment in the managerial imagination that keeps its proponents going round a hermetically sealed loop of systems (management, organizational structures) and values (leadership, organizational culture).

I don’t actually disagree that leadership (and management, and structure, and culture) matter both in organizations in general and in the NHS. But it is woefully inadequate to think that these things can make very much difference in the face of overwhelming resource deficiencies. As I’ve pointed out before on this blog, health costs are spiralling because of ageing populations, scientific advances and healthcare cost inflation that exceeds general price inflation. UK health expenditure per head is US$3405 or 15 in the world (OECD, 2011 figures), and this does not include the allied issue of care spending for, in particular the elderly.

Now, for sure, expenditure isn’t the whole story because the UK system of socialized health is more efficient than any other. Moreover, I’m very well aware that the situation in the UK is enormously privileged compared with most of the rest of the world. Still, there is a basic arithmetic here. How much difference can leadership make when compared with resources? Suppose, modestly, that it was equivalent to a 1% increase of per head expenditure. Then, the UK would remain at 15 in the league table. Suppose, more extravagantly, it was the equivalent of 10% of per head expenditure. Then the UK would rise to 14 in the list. Suppose, ludicrously surely, it was equivalent to a 20% increase in per head expenditure. Then, by a whisker, it would be 11 in the list. In fact, even if leadership had the capacity to be equivalent to a 100% increase, a doubling, in per head expenditure then the UK would still only be second in the global list. But consider this: no study has definitively shown that leadership makes any difference to organizational performance at all.

 

 

Healthy bureaucracy

This post relates in some ways to my previous one about NHS management, but is both more specific and yet with a wider import. In the current issue of the satirical magazine Private Eye the Medicine Balls column discusses one of the consequences of recent NHS reforms (the column is not available on the Private Eye website, but appears on p.17 of Issue 1394). These reforms, like most or even all public sector reforms, purports to reduce bureaucracy. Yet the column describes how the new rules mean that whereas a doctor’s surgery seeking to run community health services from its premises used to have simply to make a contract with the local health trust, now it involves a negotiation between four different bodies with multiple convoluted procedures.

This is a story that could be repeated endlessly across both private and public sector organizations. Bureaucracy is the enemy above all others (see p.81 of the book) and yet in the name of defeating it ever-more complicated bureaucracies are developed. What sense might we make of this? I think that one answer is that ‘bureaucracy’ has ceased to mean anything very precise (and certainly nothing like Max Weber’s meaning), but instead has become a catch all terms for ‘things we don’t like in organizations’. It takes a brave person to argue, as Paul du Gay does in a book I refer to several times in my book, in praise of bureaucracy (by which he does indeed mean Weberian bureaucracy), and for a practicing manager, civil servant or politician it would be simply unthinkable.

The irony of this, though, is that it is not just thinkable but necessary for managers, civil servants and politicians to devise systems which conform not to Weberian bureaucracy but to precisely its everyday sense of inefficient red-tape. We thus have the worst of all worlds: a crusade against the praiseworthy features of bureaucracy (accountability, impartiality, clarity) in the name of an anti-bureaucracy that embodies the most deleterious features of bureaucracy (complexity, sclerosis, proceduralism).

There are so many examples that it is difficult to know where to start in naming them but they range from the impossibility of switching internet service provider without a ‘key’ from your current provider to allow it, through to the chaos caused in courts because of ‘efficiency savings’ to interpreting services. But to take one recent example, last week a new system for driving licences was introduced in the UK. According to the government minister responsible this would “reduce unnecessary red tape” (aka bureaucracy). The result? Chaos.

Of course any one example can be dismissed as both minor and specific. But the cumulative effect is general and major. A huge array of transactions, both economic and civic, are becoming all but impossible. Weber would have found this completely understandable because it is emblematic of some of the problems to which bureaucracy was as a solution. He might also have observed, had he been alive, that bureaucracy would be the best way of addressing the FIFA corruption scandal. Or, at a more local level, a way of controlling free-wheeling head teachers, freed from bureaucracy to do their own thing.

The association of bureaucracy with ‘something bad’ goes back many decades but it’s a misnomer. It’s difficult to imagine an effective campaign for bureaucracy. Yet a good dose of bureaucracy, in its healthy sense, would make all our lives better.

Reference

Du Gay, P. (2000). In Praise of Bureaucracy. Weber, Organization and Ethics. London: Sage.